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Abstract
“General jurisdiction” refers to a court’s competence to adjudicate disputes arising out of a defendant’s
activities anywhere in the world. Absent consent or submission, international instruments reserve general
jurisdiction over corporations to the states in which the corporation has its registered office, centre of
administration, or principal place of business. The bases of general jurisdiction under the Court
Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (CJPTA) are far broader and include simply having a place of
business in the forum or even registering to carry on business there. This article locates the conceptual
roots of the CJPTA approach in the traditional common law presence-based concept of jurisdiction.
Although the constitutional legitimacy of the traditional common law approach was recently reaffirmed by
the Supreme Court of Canada, it is suggested that the international standard better balances the interests
of both parties and is more consonant with territorial limitations on the exercise of adjudicatory power.
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The CJPTA: A Decade of Progress

General Jurisdiction over Corporate
Defendants under the CJPTA:
Consistent with International
Standards?
CATHERINE WALSH*
“General jurisdiction” refers to a court’s competence to adjudicate disputes arising out of a
defendant’s activities anywhere in the world. Absent consent or submission, international
instruments reserve general jurisdiction over corporations to the states in which the
corporation has its registered office, centre of administration, or principal place of business.
The bases of general jurisdiction under the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act
(CJPTA) are far broader and include simply having a place of business in the forum or even
registering to carry on business there. This article locates the conceptual roots of the CJPTA
approach in the traditional common law presence-based concept of jurisdiction. Although the
constitutional legitimacy of the traditional common law approach was recently reaffirmed by
the Supreme Court of Canada, it is suggested that the international standard better balances
the interests of both parties and is more consonant with territorial limitations on the exercise
of adjudicatory power.
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THE SHORT ANSWER TO THE QUESTION posed in the title of this article is “no.”

In explaining why, it is helpful to borrow terminology from the US literature
and jurisprudence under which the bases for exercising adjudicatory jurisdiction
divide between general and specific jurisdiction.1 Specific jurisdiction refers
to bases of competence that require a connection between the subject matter
of a dispute and the defendant’s in-forum activities. General (“dispute-blind”
or “all-purpose”) jurisdiction refers to bases of competence that depend solely
on the defendant’s connection to the forum, regardless of whether the subject
matter of the dispute has any connection to the forum. General jurisdiction,
in turn, is predicated on the defendant’s consent or submission to the exercise of
jurisdiction by the court or the sufficiency of the defendant’s “presence” in the
forum. The focus here is on presence-based jurisdiction.
The common law traditionally has treated service of process on a natural
person physically present in the forum as sufficient for general jurisdiction, even
if that person’s presence was casual or transient. By a somewhat strained analogy
to natural persons, presence-based general jurisdiction could also be exercised
over a foreign corporation served with local process at a place of business in the
forum even if the subject matter of the claim was entirely unrelated to the business
1.

Arthur T von Mehren & Donald T Trautman, “Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis” (1966) 79:6 Harv L Rev 1121 at 1136-45 (proposing the distinction between
general and specific jurisdiction); Tanya Monestier, “Where is Home Depot ‘At Home’?:
Daimler v. Bauman and the End of Doing Business Jurisdiction” (2014) 66:1 Hastings
LJ 233 at 238-39 [Monestier, “Where Is Home Depot”] (observing that the seeds of this
analytical structure were planted in International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310 (1945)
[International Shoe]); Mary Twitchell, “The Myth of General Jurisdiction” (1988) 101:3
Harv L Rev 610 (coining the synonym “dispute blind” jurisdiction at 613). The synonym
“all-purpose” jurisdiction was used by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
Goodyear and Daimler cases. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v Brown, 564 US 915
(2011) [Goodyear]; Daimler AG v Bauman, 134 S Ct 746 (2014) [Daimler]. For a discussion
of these two cases, see Part II, below.
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carried on by the corporation in the forum. As Part I of this article explains, the
Supreme Court of Canada has recently reaffirmed the continued availability at
common law of general presence-based jurisdiction over corporate defendants.
The common law approach is in sharp contrast to the more restrained
standard found in the European Union under the Brussels I Regulation, in which
general jurisdiction is available over a corporation only if it has its statutory seat
(i.e., “registered office” or place of incorporation, place of central administration,
or principal place of business in the forum).2 This is also the approach to the
general jurisdiction of a foreign court over corporations for the purposes of foreign
judgment recognition adopted in the 2017 Hague Draft Convention3 and the 2016

2.

3.

EC, Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December
2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters (recast), [2012] OJ, L 351/1, arts 4, 63 [Brussels I Regulation]. Under article 4, general
jurisdiction is based on the “domicile” of the defendant in the member state. Domicile is
defined in article 63(1) so that a company (or other entity), depending on how it structures
its operations, may have three different domiciles: (a) its statutory seat; (b) its place of central
administration; or (c) its principal place of business. For the purposes of Ireland, Cyprus, and
the United Kingdom, article 63(2) defines “statutory seat” to mean “the registered office or,
where there is no such office anywhere, the place of incorporation or, where there is no such
place anywhere, the place under the law of which the formation took place.” See also EC,
Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters, [2001] OJ, L 12/44 at 1 (replaced
by Brussels I Regulation).
Hague Conference on Private International Law, “Special Commission on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: February 2017 Draft Convention” (16-24
February 2017), online: <assets.hcch.net/docs/d6f58225-0427-4a65-8f8b-180e79cafdbb.
pdf>, arts 5(1)(a), 3(2) [Hague Draft Convention]. Under article 5(1)(a), a judgment
is eligible for recognition and enforcement if the person against whom recognition or
enforcement is sought was “habitually resident” in the state of origin when it became a
party to the proceedings. Under article 3(2), an entity or person other than a natural person
is habitually resident in the state: (a) where it has its statutory seat; (b) under whose law it
was incorporated or formed; (c) where it has its central administration; or (d) where it has
its principal place of business. A corporate defendant will usually have its “statutory seat”
(“registered office”) in the state under whose law it was incorporated: In this situation, factors
(a) and (b) refer to the same place. However, the concept of statutory seat is generally not
applicable to unincorporated entities (other than limited partnerships). For this reason, and
to accommodate corporations formed under federal law in federally-organized states, it was
thought necessary to include both factors (a) and (b).
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draft Commonwealth Model Law on Foreign Judgments.4 Carrying on business in
the forum is only a basis for specific jurisdiction under these instruments; i.e., the
claim must arise out of the corporation’s in-forum business activities.5
The CJPTA6 adopts “ordinary residence” in the forum as the standard for
exercising general jurisdiction.7 For defendants who are natural persons, “ordinary
residence” clearly eliminates common law “tag” jurisdiction predicated on service
of process on a defendant who is only transiently or casually present in the
forum.8 To this extent, the CJPTA is consistent with the international instruments
referred to in the preceding paragraph. When it comes to corporations and other
business entities, however, the CJPTA defines “ordinary residence” in an expansive
manner.9 The concept is not limited to defendants whose registered office or
place of central administration is in the forum. A corporate defendant is also
deemed to be ordinarily resident in the forum if it has a place of business there,
or if it has registered pursuant to laws requiring an extra-provincial corporation
4.

5.
6.

7.
8.

9.

See Commonwealth Secretariat, A Commonwealth Model Law on Foreign Judgments: Meeting
Paper, by David McClean, Provisional Agenda Item 15(b) (London: Senior Officials of Law
Ministries, 2016), s 5(1)(e) [Commonwealth Model Bill] [on file with author]; Hague Draft
Convention, supra note 3, art 5(1)(a). Although the terminology is somewhat different,
section 5(1)(e) of the Commonwealth Model Bill is intended to parallel article 5(1)(a) of
the Hague Draft Convention in recognizing the general jurisdiction of the foreign court
if “the judgment debtor, not being an individual, was incorporated in the state of origin,
exercised its central management in that state or had its principal place of business located
in that state.”
Brussels I Regulation, supra note 2, art 7(5); Hague Draft Convention, supra note 3, art 5(1)(c);
Commonwealth Model Bill, supra note 4, s 5(1)(f ).
See Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Proceedings of the Seventy-Sixth Annual Meeting,
1994, Appendix C: Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, online: <www.ulcc.ca/
images/stories/1994_EN_pdf/1994ulcc0008_Court_Jurisdiction_Proceedings_Transfer_Act.
pdf> at 140 [CJPTA]. Three jurisdictions have brought the CJPTA into force—British
Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Nova Scotia. See Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer
Act, SBC 2003, c 28 [CJPTA, BC]; The Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act,
SS 1997, c C-41.1 [CJPTA, SK]; Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SNS 2003
(2d Sess), c 2. For ease of reference, the section numbering of the British Columbia Act is
used in this article.
CJPTA, BC, supra note 6 (“A court has territorial competence in a proceeding that is brought
against a person … if … that person is ordinarily resident in British Columbia at the time of
the commencement of the proceeding … ,” s 3(d)).
Maharanee Seethadevi Gaekwar of Baroda v Wildenstein, [1972] 2 QB 283 at 291-92, [1972]
2 WLR 1077 (CA). For a pre-CJPTA British Columbia decision confirming the continued
availability of jurisdiction at common law over an individual defendant who is only casually
or transiently present in the forum when served with process, see Ruwenzori Enterprises Ltd v
Walji, 2000 BCSC 790, [2000] BCTC 348.
CJPTA, supra note 6, s 7.
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carrying on business in the enacting province to register and appoint a local agent
for the purposes of service of process. As will be seen in Part II of the article,
these latter two concepts of ordinary residence replicate and arguably exceed
the traditional common law concept of corporate presence for the purposes of
general jurisdiction.
The Canadian common law and CJPTA presence-based approaches to
general jurisdiction over corporations are not only inconsistent with international
standards. As explained in Part III of the article, they are also out of step with
the recent jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States limiting
general jurisdiction, save in exceptional cases, to the states where the corporation
is “at home” in the sense of either being incorporated under the law of that
state or having its principal place of business there. Part III reviews the policy
and pragmatic justifications advanced in the United States in favour of limiting
general jurisdiction to a corporation’s “home” fora. It will be argued that these
justifications are equally or even more relevant in the CJPTA and Canadian
common law context.
The conclusion in Part IV questions the justification for the persistence in
common law Canada and under the CJPTA of the broad common law concept of
presence-based general jurisdiction over corporate defendants. The consequence
of that approach is to expose a corporation doing business in multiple provinces
to the burden of having to respond to suits in every jurisdiction where it has
established a place of business even though the dispute has nothing to do with
its activities in that province. Moreover, the burden and inconvenience for
the corporate defendant is not the only concern. A broad theory of general
jurisdiction greatly expands the potential for courts in multiple jurisdictions to
claim adjudicatory authority over the same dispute. It will be suggested that the
more restrained international standard better balances convenience for litigants
while also taking into account the mutual interest of all jurisdictions in respecting
the territorial limits on the reach of the adjudicatory authority of their courts.

I. COMMON LAW PRESENCE-BASED JURISDICTION OVER
CORPORATE DEFENDANTS
The common law traditionally has treated service of process on an individual
defendant while physically present in the forum as sufficient for general
jurisdiction even if the defendant’s presence is only transient or casual.10 A concept
10. See supra note 8.
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of jurisdiction that relies on a defendant’s physical presence in the forum does
not translate easily to corporations or other business entities. A corporation is
prima facie assumed to be “present” in the jurisdiction where it is domiciled, i.e.,
in the state under whose laws it is incorporated,11 or more precisely—to cover
federally-incorporated companies—where its head office or registered office is
located.12 The English and Canadian jurisprudence, however, early on confirmed
that where a corporation carries on business outside its ‘birth place’ and is served
with process there, it may also have a sufficient “presence” in that place to support
the exercise of jurisdiction.13 In so holding, the courts, particularly in the earlier
cases, have sometimes used the metaphor of “residence.”14 The use of that metaphor
is open to criticism since the meaning of corporate residence is not universal
11. Okura & Co Ltd v Forsbacka Jernverks Aktiebolag, [1914] 1 KB 715 at 722, 80 LJKB 561
(CA) [Okura]. In Okura, Lord Justice Phillimore wrote: “I take it that every corporation is
prima facie locally situated in the territory of the sovereign power from which it derives its
origin.” See ibid. See also Machado v The Catalyst Capital Group Inc, 2015 ONSC 6313,
27 CCEL (4th) 116 [Machado]. In Machado, it was said:
Because the Defendant’s registered head office is located in Ontario, an Ontario court has
‘presence-based’ jurisdiction over the Defendant. Ontario thus has jurisdiction simpliciter,
and it is not necessary to apply the ‘real and substantial connection’ test to extend ‘assumed
jurisdiction’ over the Defendant (ibid at para 60).

For authority that the place of incorporation of a company is its domicile, see National Trust
Co v Ebro Irrigation & Power Co, [1954] OR 463, [1954] 3 DLR 326 (SC) [National Trust];
Gasque v Commissioners of Inland Revenue, [1940] 2 KB 80, 109 LJKB 769 (KBD) [Gasque].
12. The location of a corporation’s head office or registered office ordinarily coincides with
the jurisdiction under whose laws it is incorporated owing to the typical corporate law
requirement for a corporation to maintain its registered office or head office in its jurisdiction
of incorporation. However, in the case of a federally incorporated corporation, reference
must necessarily be made to the province that it has designated as the location of its head
office or registered office.
13. Note that where the dispute relates to the internal management and affairs of a company,
jurisdiction is reserved exclusively to the courts in its jurisdiction of incorporation (or in the
jurisdiction where its registered head office is located in the case of federally-incorporated
companies). See Gould v Western Coal Corp, 2012 ONSC 5184 at paras 319-39, 221 ACWS
(3d) 789; Ironrod Investments Inc v Enquest Energy Services Corp, 2011 ONSC 308, 198
ACWS (3d) 341; Takefman c Golden Hope Mines Ltd, 2015 QCCS 4947, 260 ACWS (3d)
274; Wilson v Hudson’s Bay Co (1884), 1 BCR (Pt 2) 102, [1884] BCJ No 16 (QL) (SC).
14. See e.g. Newby v Von Oppen (1872), (1871-72) LR 7 QB 293, 41 LJQB 148 [Newby];
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v Thomas Law & Co (La Bourgogne), [1899] AC 431,
15 TLR 424 (HL (Eng)); Tytler v Canadian Pacific Railway Co (1899), 26 OAR 467 at
472, [1899] OJ No 48 (QL) [Tytler]; Murphy v Phoenix Bridge Co (1899), 18 OPR 495
at 499-503, [1899] OJ No 249 (QL) (CA) [Murphy]; Charron v La Banque provinciale du
Canada, [1936] OWN 315, [1936] OJ No 78 (QL) (H Ct J) [Charron].
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or constant but rather depends on the legal context in which the issue arises.15
In any event, in the context of presence-based jurisdiction, it is accepted that the
terms presence and residence have the same meaning and that a corporation may
simultaneously be present (or reside) in multiple jurisdictions for this purpose.16
Although the analysis is intensely fact-specific, in general, a foreign company
is considered to have a sufficient presence in the forum if it carries on its business
or an aspect of its business there at a fixed place for a sufficiently substantial
period.17 There is no difficulty in finding presence-based jurisdiction under this
test where a foreign company establishes a physical place of business in the forum
in its own name, staffed by its own employees, to carry out its business there.18
A sufficient corporate presence, however, has been found in circumstances far
removed from the branch office scenario. A fixed place of business, for example,
need not be a place owned or rented by the company, so long as some aspect of its
business is conducted there.19 The period during which the company’s business
is carried on in the forum need not be very long, for example, nine days was

15. For example, it is long accepted that the residence of a corporation (and now a trust) for
income tax purposes is in the jurisdiction where its central management and control is
exercised. See Garron Family Trust (Trustee of ) v R, 2012 SCC 14 at para 6, [2012] 1 SCR
520. However, it is also accepted that the meaning of corporate residence depends on the
nature and the purpose of the statute or rule in issue, and that in other legal contexts,
a corporation may have multiple residences. See Canada Life Assurance Co v Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce, [1979] 2 SCR 669 at 676-81, 98 DLR (3d) 670.
16. South India Shipping Corporation Ltd v Export-Import Bank of Korea, [1985] 1 WLR
585 at 589, [1985] 2 All ER 2019 (CA) [India]; Okura, supra note 11 at 721. See also
Pippa Rogerson, Collier’s Conflict of Laws, 4th ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2013) at 240.
17. The test is derived from Lord Buckley’s remarks in Okura, supra note 11 at 718-19. For
the leading Canadian case on its appropriate interpretation, see Canada Life Assurance Co v
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1974), 3 OR (2d) 70, 44 DLR (3d) 486 (CA), leave
to appeal to SCC refused, [1974] SCR viii [Canada Life Assurance]. In Canada Life Assurance,
Chief Justice Gale adopted Justice Sydney Smith’s interpretation of the meaning of “carrying
on business” in Central Trust Company v Dolphin Steamship Company (1950), [1950] 2
WWR 516, [1951] 1 DLR 19 (BC CA). For recent judicial analyses of the test, see Allchem
Industries Industrial v “CMA CGM Florida” (Vessel), 2015 FC 558, 253 ACWS (3d) 778
[Allchem]; Yip v HSBC Holdings plc, 2017 ONSC 5332, 283 ACWS (3d) 886 [Yip].
18. See e.g. Newby, supra note 14; Charron, supra note 14.
19. See e.g. Actiesselkabet Dampskib Hercules v Grand Trunk Pacific Railway Co, [1912] 1 KB 222,
[1912] 105 LT 695 (CA) (it was held that four Canadian directors conducting business,
rent-free, out of a London office for a Canadian corporation were carrying on the business of
the London company and that the office was therefore the office of the Canadian corporation
for the purposes of establishing its presence in UK).
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held in one English case to be sufficient.20 The company need not be directly
conducting its business in the forum; an indirect presence through an agency
or representative is sufficient provided that the agent is doing the business of
the company,21 and not its own business.22 That said, the activities alleged to
constitute carrying on business, whether carried out directly or indirectly, must
be integrally related to some aspect of the company’s business, and there must be
some regularity to them.23
It has traditionally been accepted that if a corporation has a sufficient
“presence” in the forum according to these criteria when served with process,
the court has general jurisdiction, i.e., it is irrelevant that the subject matter of
the claim does not arise out of the company’s business in the forum.24 Although
the Supreme Court of Canada in Morguard stated that the defendant’s in-forum
presence, when served with process, remained a distinct ground of jurisdiction
separate from jurisdiction in service ex juris cases which required a real and
substantial connection between the claim and the forum,25 ambiguities in the
post-Morguard jurisprudence created some doubt.26 The point was reaffirmed by
20. See e.g. Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Actien-Gesellschaft für Motor und Motorfahrzeugbau
Vorm Cudell & Co, [1902] 1 KB 342, [1902] 71 LJKB 284 (CA) [Dunlop]. In Dunlop,
a German company hired the use of a stand at an exhibition in London for a total of eight
days at which two representatives exhibited products and took orders. The Court of Appeal
held that the company had established a place of business in England sufficient to make
service on its representatives at the stand service on the company.
21. Allchem, supra note 17. See also Rogerson, supra note 16 at 242-44.
22. Sarco Canada Ltd v Pyrotherm Equipment Ltd, [1969] 1 OR 426, 40 Fox Pat C
182 (SC) [Sarco].
23. Ibid; Murphy, supra note 14; Appel v Anchor Insurance & Investment Corp (1921), 21 OWN
25 at 27, [1921] OJ No 161 (QL) (H Ct J); Wee-Gee Uranium Mines Ltd v New York
Times Co, [1969] 1 OR 741, [1969] OJ No 1279 (QL) (H Ct J); Venture Helicopters Ltd v
European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co Eads NV, 2010 ABQB 633, 38 Alta LR (5th) 121.
See also Wat-cha Farms Ltd v Charolais International Inc, [1971] 5 WWR 554, [1971] AJ
No 78 (QL) (SC).
24. See Tytler, supra note 14; Charron, supra note 14. Although the courts in these cases did not
expressly state that service of process had been effected locally, it seems evident from the facts
(location of a branch office) that this would have been the case.
25. Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye, [1990] 3 SCR 1077 at 1103, 52 BCLR (2d) 160
[Morguard]. Although Morguard was concerned with the recognition of a foreign court’s
jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcement of its judgments, Justice La Forest made it clear
that “the taking of jurisdiction by a court in one province and its recognition in another must
be viewed as correlative” (ibid at 1094).
26. See Tanya J Monestier, “(Still) a ‘Real and Substantial’ Mess: The Law of Jurisdiction
in Canada” (2013) 36:2 Fordham Int’l LJ 396 at 447, n 158 [Monestier,
“Jurisdiction in Canada”].
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the Court in Club Resorts Ltd v Van Breda27 but in a confusing manner.28 On the
one hand, the Court stated that “jurisdiction may also be based on traditional
grounds, like the defendant’s presence in the jurisdiction.”29 On the other hand,
it treated “carrying on business” in the forum as merely a presumptive connecting
factor for jurisdiction in tort claims against corporate defendants served outside
the jurisdiction, rebuttable “by showing that the subject matter of the litigation
is unrelated to the defendant’s business activities in the province.”30
Van Breda thus left it unclear whether in juris service on a corporate defendant
carrying on business in the forum remained available as a basis for the exercise
of general jurisdiction over claims unrelated to the defendant’s forum activities.
Further uncertainty was created by the Court’s observation that “a defendant
may always be sued in a court of the jurisdiction in which he or she is domiciled
or resident (in the case of a legal person, the location of its head office).”31 The
parenthetical reference to a legal person’s head office as constituting its domicile
or residence arguably contradicted the traditional view, outlined above, that a
corporation may have as many “residences” as it has places where it is carrying on
business for the purposes of establishing traditional presence-based jurisdiction
provided it is capable of being served with process locally. Moreover, the Court
listed “domicile or residence” as a separate presumptive connecting factor in tort
actions, distinct from carrying on business, implying that jurisdiction on this
basis also could be rebutted if the subject-matter of the dispute was otherwise
unrelated to the forum.32 This also seemingly contradicted the traditional view,
noted above, that general jurisdiction may always be exercised over a corporation
at its domicile.
The Court sought to clarify the matter in Chevron Corp v Yaiguaje.33 The
point arose in relation to the jurisdiction of the Ontario courts over Chevron
Canada, a third party to the foreign judgment obtained against its parent
company Chevron Corporation, for which recognition was being sought in

27. 2012 SCC 17, [2012] 1 SCR 572 [Van Breda].
28. Tanya J Monestier provides an excellent detailed critique. See Monestier, “Jurisdiction in
Canada,” supra note 26 at 417-24.
29. Van Breda, supra note 27 at para 79.
30. Ibid at para 96.
31. Ibid at para 86.
32. Ibid at para 90.
33. Chevron Corp v Yaiguaje, 2015 SCC 42, [2015] 3 SCR 69 [Chevron].
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Ontario.34 Although Chevron Canada was incorporated under the Canada
Business Corporations Act and had designated an address in British Columbia as
its “registered office,” it had been served with process at a “bricks and mortar”
office it had established in Ontario from which its Ontario staff provided services
and solicited sales to its Ontario customers.
Chevron Canada argued that regardless of whether a corporate defendant is
served in juris or ex juris, carrying on business in the forum is only a presumptive
connecting factor which can be rebutted by showing that there is no connection
between the claim and the corporation’s in-forum activities. The Court rejected
that argument, observing that the maintenance of physical business premises in
the forum accompanied by a degree of sustained business activity have consistently
been found to be “compelling indicia of corporate presence.”35 It further stated
that to require a specific connection between the defendant’s in-forum activities
and the subject matter of the claim would “conflate” the long-standing distinction
between “presence-based” jurisdiction in service in juris cases and “assumed
jurisdiction” in service ex juris cases.36
The Court then went on to address Chevron Canada’s argument that merely
carrying on unrelated business in the forum was an illegitimate basis for the
exercise of general jurisdiction insofar as the “real and substantial connection”
principle also operates as a constitutional limit on the exercise of adjudicatory
power. The Court rejected this aspect of that defendant’s argument on the
conclusory reasoning that by electing to establish and continue to operate a place
of business in Ontario at which it was served, Chevron Canada “should therefore
… expect … that it might one day be called upon to answer to an Ontario court’s
request that it defend against an action” and that “it is reasonable to say that the
34. The action against Chevron Canada sought to seize its shares and assets to satisfy the
Ecuadorian judgment obtained against its corporate parent. The Ontario Superior Court of
Justice subsequently granted Chevron Canada’s motion to dismiss the action. See Yaiguaje
v Chevron Corp, 2017 ONSC 135 at para 74, 136 OR (3d) 261. Chevron Canada’s shares
and assets were held not to be exigible since it was not the judgment debtor under the
Ecuadorian judgment and the court further refused to pierce the corporate veil, there being
no allegation that the Chevron group corporate structure was designed or being used an
instrument of fraud or wrongdoing (ibid at paras 34-49). The Superior Court’s ruling has
been appealed and the Ontario Court of Appeal recently set aside an order requiring the
appellants to post security for costs, observing that “[i]t cannot be said, at this stage, that this
is a case that is wholly devoid of merit” and that it “is hardly just that potential advancements
in or restatements of the law be thwarted for procedural or tactical reasons.” See Yaiguaje v
Chevron Corporation, 2017 ONCA 827 at para 26(e), (f ), 138 OR (3d) 1.
35. Chevron, supra note 33 at paras 85-86.
36. Ibid at para 81.
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Ontario courts have an interest in [such a] defendant and the disputes in which
it becomes involved.”37
The Court’s ruling on jurisdiction over Chevron Canada was made in the
context of foreign judgment recognition proceedings against its parent company.
Its principal significance going forward lies in its explicit confirmation that
service in the forum on a corporate defendant carrying on business in the forum
vests general jurisdiction in the court both as a matter of common law and
constitutional law.38 As the Court made clear, general presence-based jurisdiction
is distinct from “carrying on business in the forum” as a presumptive connecting
factor for assumed jurisdiction in tort actions against a defendant served outside
the forum. In the latter case, while carrying on business is presumptively sufficient
to vest general jurisdiction, that presumption can be rebutted by showing
that there is no connection between the subject matter of the dispute and the
defendant’s activities in the forum.39 In contrast, if service is effected in the forum
on a company carrying on business in the forum, jurisdiction is conclusive and
irrebuttable.40
This is not an insignificant distinction. While the defendant can still argue
that the court should stay the action in favour of the forum with the closest
relation to the subject-matter, it is by no means certain that the court will accede
to a forum non conveniens argument even if the dispute bears no connection
to the defendant’s forum activities. After all, as the Court emphasized in Van
Breda, the doctrine of forum non conveniens should only be applied in exceptional
cases. Moreover, the primary emphasis at the jurisdiction simpliciter stage is on
“objective factors that connect the legal situation or the subject matter of the

37. Ibid at para 89.
38. Ibid at para 83.
39. Ibid at para 91. For an example of a case where the defendant successfully rebutted
the presumption of jurisdiction on this basis, see Wilson v RIU, 2012 ONSC 6840,
98 CCLT (3d) 337.
40. See Chevron, supra note 33 at para 87. The court confirmed that presence-based jurisdiction
is not open to rebuttal on the basis that the subject matter of the dispute has no connection
to the business carried on by the defendant in the forum:
[W]here jurisdiction stems from the defendant’s presence in the jurisdiction, there is no need
to consider whether a real and substantial connection exists … In other words, the question
of whether jurisdiction exists over Chevron Canada should begin and end with traditional,
presence-based jurisdiction in this case (ibid).
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litigation with the forum.”41 In contrast, the primary emphasis at the forum non
conveniens stage is on more subjective considerations of fairness and efficiency
for both parties,42 thereby increasing the likelihood that the court will retain
jurisdiction where a local plaintiff lacks the resources to pursue the defendant
in a more remote forum or in class action proceedings where considerations of
litigation efficiency play into the analysis.
As Monestier has observed, it is odd, indeed conceptually incoherent,
to hold that the same jurisdictional connection—“carrying on business” in the
forum—should give rise to different consequences for a defendant depending
on whether it is served within the forum or outside.43 Moreover, the availability
of presence-based general jurisdiction will depend on, and vary with, the scope
of the civil procedure rules of the relevant province relating to local service on a
corporation. For example, the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure authorize service
on the person in apparent control or management of any “place of business”
of the corporation in the province,44 whereas the Alberta counterpart to this rule
refers to any “place of business or activity” and authorizes service by recorded
mail to that address.45 Service on a corporation can also be effected by service on
a representative, but again, the formulations vary. For example, the Ontario rules
refer to service on “an officer, director or agent of the corporation,”46 while the
Alberta rules refer to an “officer” who “appears to have management and control
responsibilities with respect to the corporation.”47

41. See Van Breda, supra note 27 at para 82:
Jurisdiction must … be established primarily on the basis of objective factors that connect the
legal situation or the subject matter of the litigation with the forum. … Abstract concerns for
order, efficiency or fairness in the system are no substitute for connecting factors that give rise
to a ‘real and substantial’ connection for the purposes of the law of conflicts [emphasis added].

42. See ibid at para 105:
A party applying for a stay on the basis of forum non conveniens
facts, considerations and concerns. … In essence, the doctrine
contexts of individual cases, and its purpose is to ensure that both
fairly and that the process for resolving their litigation is efficient

may raise diverse
focusses on the
parties are treated
[emphasis added].

43. Tanya J Monestier, “You’re It! Tag Jurisdiction over Corporations in Canada” (2017) 50:3
Vand J Transnat’l L 583 at 612-16 [Monestier, “Jurisdiction over Corporations”].
44. Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, r 16.02(1)(c) [Ontario Rules].
45. Alberta, Rules of Court, AR 124/2010, vol 1, r 11.9(1) [Alberta Rules] [emphasis added].
46. Ontario Rules, supra note 44, r 16.02(1)(c).
47. Alberta Rules, supra note 45, r 11.13(1).
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This criticism assumes that “carrying on business” for the purposes of
establishing presence-based jurisdiction has the same meaning as when “carrying
on business” is relied on as a presumptive connecting factor in service ex juris
cases. There seems little doubt that this was the understanding of the Court
in Chevron. After stating that “the common law has consistently found the
maintenance of physical business premises to be a compelling jurisdictional
factor” for presence-based jurisdiction, the Court went on to say that “LeBel J.
accepted this in Van Breda when he held that ‘carrying on business requires some
form of actual, not only virtual, presence in the jurisdiction, such as maintaining
an office there.’”48 Since Van Breda was a case of assumed jurisdiction, it is evident
that the Court considered the concept of “carrying on business” to carry the same
meaning in both contexts, and the criteria for corporate presence in Chevron
has been referenced in the subsequent case law interpreting the concept of
“carrying on business” for the purposes of assumed jurisdiction under the Van
Breda framework.49
The issue was directly addressed in Yip v HSBC Holdings plc, a 2017 decision
of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in which assumed jurisdiction was
alleged to be available over a foreign corporation on the basis that it was carrying
on business in Ontario.50 In a comprehensive and persuasive analysis, the court
traced the origin of “carrying on business” as a presumptive connecting factor
in Van Breda to the pre-Van Breda jurisprudence on traditional presence-based
general jurisdiction.51 As the court explained, much of the case law on carrying
on business in the presence-based jurisdictional context was developed at a time
when the rules governing local service on a foreign corporation deemed “any
person who within Ontario transacts or carries on any of the [corporation’s]
business” to be an “agent” of the corporation for the purposes of local service.52
In interpreting “carrying on business” for the purposes of this provision, the cases
recognized that the issue, although superficially one of practice, went to the more
fundamental question of whether the activities carried on by the alleged “agent”
in the forum when served with process were sufficient to make the foreign
corporation “present” in the forum for the court to have general jurisdiction over
48. Chevron, supra note 33 at para 85.
49. Stuart Budd & Sons Ltd v IFS Vehicle Distributors ULC, 2016 ONCA 977 at paras 7-17, 135
OR (3d) 551 [Budd]; King v Giardina, 2017 ONSC 1588 at para 47, n 21, 279 ACWS (3d)
525; Yip, supra note 17 at paras 157-58. See also Monestier, “Jurisdiction over Corporations,”
supra note 43 at 615.
50. Yip, supra note 17.
51. Ibid at paras 155-200.
52. Ibid at paras 167-69.
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it at common law. Consequently, the court concluded, “carrying on business”
should be interpreted for the purposes of assumed jurisdiction under the Van
Breda framework in line with its roots in presence-based general jurisdiction:
[C]arrying on business “in” a jurisdiction means that the foreign defendant’s activity
in the jurisdiction approaches that or has the intensity of the defendant being a
resident in the jurisdiction amenable to being personally served with a court process
in that jurisdiction, which … is the source of the idea that carrying on business in
the jurisdiction is presumptive of having a real and substantial connection with the
jurisdiction.53

The difficulty is that in the assumed jurisdiction context, the defendant
quite evidently was not served with process locally nor do the courts require a
showing that this would have been possible under the forum’s rules for service
of process. On the other hand, since general jurisdiction based on “carrying on
business” under the Van Breda framework is rebuttable by showing the absence
of a subject matter connection to the forum, the concept has tended to receive
a flexible, case-specific, and correspondingly elastic interpretation in order to
enable jurisdiction to be exercised, notwithstanding that it is evident that the
corporation could not have been served with process locally. Budd54 is a good
example. In that case, the Court of Appeal for Ontario affirmed the motion
judge’s ruling that a foreign corporation was carrying on business in Ontario for
the purposes of assumed jurisdiction even though the business allegedly done
in Ontario was mainly not carried out at any physical place in the province.55
In challenging the motions judge’s ruling, the appellants had cited Chevron
and several other cases as requiring a more substantial physical presence. While
acknowledging that “a more substantial presence, along the lines discussed in the
cases, would have added weight to the motion judge’s determination,” the court
emphasized that “each case invoking the … [presumptive connecting factor] of
carrying on business in Ontario must be considered on its unique facts.”56 The
case involved a class action proceeding, a context where courts may be inclined
towards a liberal interpretation of carrying on business to preserve jurisdiction
in the interests of litigation efficiency and fairness to plaintiffs. In endorsing

53.
54.
55.
56.

Ibid at para 160.
Budd, supra note 49.
Ibid at paras 7-17.
Ibid at para 17. Note that the court referred to “carrying on business” as the fourth
presumptive connecting factor recognized in Van Breda when in fact it is the second. See Van
Breda, supra note 27 at para 90.
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an elastic, case-specific approach to the meaning of “carrying on business,” the
Court of Appeal may have been influenced by this consideration.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Chevron was careful to limit its ruling
on the constitutional legitimacy of common law presence-based jurisdiction to
presence as established “in this case.”57 This leaves the door open to the argument
that the real and substantial connection principle as a constitutional limit may on
other facts constrain the meaning of “carrying on business.” And since the term
has the same meaning in both the presence-based and presumptive jurisdiction
contexts, the same challenge presumably could also be made in the latter context.
Admittedly, in Lapointe Rosenstein Marchand Melançon LLP v Cassels Brock
& Blackwell LLP,58 the Supreme Court emphasized that the fourth presumptive
connecting factor in Van Breda—that the dispute be connected to a contract
made in the forum—should not be interpreted in an “unduly narrow” manner
that would undermine “flexibility and commercial efficiency.”59 This suggests
that the Court might be inclined to also endorse an elastic approach to “carrying
on business” at both the common law and constitutional law levels. On the other
hand, the fourth presumptive connecting factor at least requires that the contract
have some connection to the dispute, however indirect. Consistent with its origins
in presence-based jurisdiction, “carrying on business,” like the presumptive
connecting factors of “domicile or residence,” establishes presumptive general
jurisdiction, i.e., there is no need to show that the dispute is related to the
business carried on in the forum: The absence of a subject-matter connection is
merely a basis on which the presumption of jurisdiction may be rebutted. Thus,
a broad theory of the second presumptive connecting factor that exceeds even the
generous approach adopted in Chevron would run a greater danger of creating
universal jurisdiction for all local plaintiffs in relation to all foreign corporations
that have some business presence in the forum, a consequence that the Court
cautioned against in Van Breda.60
All of the above suggests that establishing the outer boundaries of “carrying
on business” for the purposes of both presence-based and assumed jurisdiction
promises to be a fruitful source of litigation in years to come. Moreover, the
problem is not limited to the domestic jurisdiction context. A corporate
defendant’s presence in the forum, when served with process, has also traditionally
been recognized as a sufficient basis at common law for the exercise of general
57.
58.
59.
60.

Chevron, supra note 33 at para 89 [emphasis added].
2016 SCC 30, [2016] 1 SCR 851 [Lapointe].
Ibid at para 32.
Van Breda, supra note 27 at para 87.
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jurisdiction by foreign courts in the foreign judgment recognition context,61
and courts have used the same approach, and often relied on the same cases,
to elucidate the meaning of corporate presence in the latter context.62
In Chevron, the Court did not suggest that its ruling on the legitimacy of
presence-based general jurisdiction over corporations for the purposes of domestic
jurisdiction did not have equal application in the context of recognizing foreign
judgments. On the contrary, in observing that the common law has always
considered the establishment of a physical place of business and the sustained
carrying on of business there as sufficient to establish presence-based jurisdiction
over a corporation, the Court placed primary reliance on cases decided in the
foreign judgment recognition context.63
Chevron thus has important implications for all Canadian corporations doing
business nationally or internationally. The constitutional obligation to give full
faith and credit to sister province judgments means that the courts in all provinces
are obligated to recognize the exercise of jurisdiction by courts in sister provinces
as legitimate if the defendant carried on business in the judgment forum and was
served with process there. In the common law provinces, the same presumably
applies to judgments rendered against Canadian corporations by courts outside
of Canada if the corporation was served within the jurisdiction. Saskatchewan is
an exception insofar that its Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, applicable to
judgments rendered by courts outside of Canada, defines “ordinary residence”

61. In the wake of Morguard, the issue of presence-based jurisdiction in the foreign judgment
context was litigated most frequently in the context of the Reciprocal Enforcement of
Judgments Acts adopted by many of the common law provinces. These Acts were adopted
prior to Morguard and provided, in line with the pre-Morguard common law, that no order
for registration could be made if the defendant was not ordinarily resident or carrying on
business within the jurisdiction of the original court when the action was commenced
and did not voluntarily submit to its jurisdiction. Following Morguard, it was frequently
argued that the legislation should be more liberally construed to facilitate registration where
the judgment related to a claim that had a real and substantial connection to the foreign
judgment forum. That argument was generally rejected with the result that the foreign
judgment creditor had to instead proceed by way of a common law action on the foreign
judgment. See Acme Video Inc v Hedges (1993), 12 OR (3d) 160, 38 ACWS (3d) 1129 (CA);
TDI Hospitality Management Consultants Inc v Browne (1994), 95 Man R (2d) 302, 117
DLR (4th) 289 (CA) [TDI Hospitality]; Laasch v Turenne, 2009 ABQB 267, 476 AR 377.
62. See e.g. Mahon/Moore Group of Cos v Mercator Enterprises Ltd (1978), 31 NSR (2d) 327,
90 DLR (3d) 590 (SC) (cited as “[a] leading case” on the meaning of “carrying on business”
in TDI Hospitality, supra note 61 at para 13).
63. Chevron, supra note 33 at para 85, citing Wilson v Hull (1995), 174 AR 81 at para 52, 128
DLR (4th) 403 (CA); Adams v Cape Industries Plc, [1990] Ch 433, [1990] 2 WLR 657 (CA).
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in the same manner as the international standard.64 New Brunswick’s Foreign
Judgments Act also adopts “ordinary residence” as the standard for foreign court
jurisdiction but does not define the term, so the position is unclear.65 In the other
common law provinces the law relating to foreign judgment recognition has not
been codified, and the common law rule that presence suffices for foreign court
jurisdiction continues to apply. So far as foreign country judgments are concerned,
however, Canadian corporations are likely protected in practice by the fact that
presence-based jurisdiction is available only in common law jurisdictions and has
now been rejected in the United States, as Part II of the article explains.
Whether carrying on business in the foreign judgment forum, if served ex
juris, would also be a basis for foreign judgment recognition is a more open
question. This will depend on whether the presumptive connecting factor
approach adopted in Van Breda also operates to determine the jurisdiction
of foreign courts in the foreign judgment recognition context, a matter that
remains unresolved.66

II. GENERAL JURISDICTION UNDER THE CJPTA:
“ORDINARY RESIDENCE”
The CJPTA adopts the “ordinary residence” of the defendant in the forum as
the standard for general jurisdiction.67 This is sometimes treated as marking a
significant change from the common law concept of presence-based jurisdiction.
This is true insofar as jurisdiction is detached from procedural issues of service
of process.68 General jurisdiction under the CJPTA exists if the defendant is
64. The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, SS 2005, c E-9.121, ss 8(d)-(e). General
jurisdiction in the state of origin is recognized if the judgment debtor “being an individual,
was ordinarily resident in the state of origin” (ibid, s 8(d)) or “not being an individual, was
incorporated in the state of origin, exercised its central management in that state or had
its principal place of business located in that state” (ibid, s 8(e)). This act is modelled on
the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act
(2003), ss 8(d)-(e), online: <www.ulcc.ca/en/home/353-josetta-1-en-gb/uniform-actsa/
enforcement-of-foreign-judgments-act/662-enforcement-of-foreign-judgments-act>.
65. Foreign Judgments Act, RSNB 2011, c 162, s 2(a).
66. Tanya J Monestier, “Foreign Judgments at Common Law: Rethinking the Enforcement
Rules” (2005) 28:1 Dal LJ 163.
67. CJPTA, BC, supra note 6, s 3(d) (note that general jurisdiction based on the defendant’s
consent or submission to the adjudicatory authority of the forum court is preserved
by ss 3(b)-(c)).
68. See e.g. Purple Echo Productions, Inc v KCTS Television, 2008 BCCA 85 at para 31,
76 BCLR (4th) 21.
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ordinarily resident in the forum at the time of commencement of the proceeding
regardless of whether it is served within or outside the jurisdiction.69 It is also
true that for individual defendants, ordinary residence marks a departure from
the traditional common law view that merely casual or transient presence suffices.
While the CJPTA does not define what constitutes the ordinary residence of
an individual, the term is a long-standing one in a diversity of jurisdictional
contexts, and self-evidently does not include a fleeting presence in the forum.70
When it comes to corporate defendants, however, common law
presence-based jurisdiction remains alive and well in substance if not in name.
To determine the ordinary residence of a corporation, section 7 of the CJPTA
provides the following four alternative standards, any one of which is sufficient
to found general jurisdiction:
7. A corporation is ordinarily resident in [the enacting province or territory] … if
(a) the corporation has or is required by law to have a registered office in [the enacting
province or territory],
(b) pursuant to law, it
(i) has registered an address in [the enacting province or territory] at which process
may be served generally, or
(ii) has nominated an agent in [the enacting province or territory] upon whom process
may be served generally,
(c) it has a place of business in [the enacting province or territory], or
(d) its central management is exercised in [the enacting province or territory].71

As explained in the analysis that follows, while the definitions of “ordinary
residence” in paragraphs (a) and (d) above are entirely consistent with the type
of defendant connections needed for general jurisdiction under international
standards, the definitions in paragraphs (b) and (d) define ordinary residence
in a manner that preserves and arguably enlarges the common law concept of
“carrying on business” discussed in Part I above.
69. See e.g. Vaughn Black, Stephen GA Pitel & Michael Sobkin, Statutory Jurisdiction:
An Analysis of the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (Toronto: Carswell, 2012) at
73-75 (general jurisdiction exists even if the defendant is no longer ordinarily resident in the
forum at the time of actual service of the process of the court).
70. Ibid at 75-76. Note, however, that the courts have given the term “ordinarily resident” in
the CJPTA, in the context of individual defendants, “a broad and liberal interpretation,
in accordance with the provisions of the Act regarding corporations ordinarily resident in the
province.” See Blazek v Blazek, 2009 BCSC 1693 at para 33, 86 CPC (6th) 128.
71. CJPTA, supra note 6.
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A. “REGISTERED OFFICE” (PLACE OF INCORPORATION) IN THE FORUM

The reference to a corporation’s “registered office” in section 7(a) as constituting
its “ordinary residence” refers to the general requirement for a corporation
to maintain its “registered office” in the jurisdiction under whose laws it is
incorporated.72 In Canada’s federal framework, it is understood to refer to two
categories of corporate defendants.73 The first comprises corporations organized
under the law of the enacting CJPTA province. Thus, a corporation organized
under the British Columbia Business Corporations Act is always subject to the
general jurisdiction of the British Columbia courts in claims brought against it in
that province.74 The second category comprises Canadian corporations organized
under federal law that elect to specify the relevant CJPTA jurisdiction as the
location of their “registered office” (or “head office” where that term is instead
used in the relevant federal law).75
The idea that a corporation should always be subject to the general jurisdiction
of the courts at its ‘birth place’ is a long-standing and entirely uncontroversial
proposition. Not surprisingly, it is also a basis of general jurisdiction in the Brussels
I Regulation in the European Union, and for recognition of foreign judgment
purposes in the 2017 Hague Draft Convention76 and the 2016 draft Commonwealth

72. See e.g. Business Corporations Act, SBC 2002, c 57, s 34(1) [BCBCA]. Note that section 8(a)
of the CJPTA addresses the concept of ordinary residence as it relates to partnerships in a
parallel manner to section 7(a) and thus deems a partnership to be ordinarily resident in
the enacting jurisdiction if the partnership has, or is required to have, “a registered office or
business address” there. Limited liability partnerships are typically required, as a condition of
their coming into existence, to designate a registered office in the jurisdiction under whose
laws they are constituted with the result that courts of that jurisdiction will always have
general jurisdiction over them under this criterion. See e.g. Partnership Act, RSBC 1996,
c 348, ss 54(1), 108(1).
73. Black, Pitel & Sobkin, supra note 69 at 77-78.
74. See e.g. Environmental Packaging Technologies Ltd v Rudjuk, 2012 BCCA 343 at para
12, 36 BCLR (5th) 103; Livingston v IMW Industries Ltd, 2015 BCSC 1627 at para
38, 257 ACWS (3d) 82; Araya v Nevsun Resources Ltd, 2017 BCCA 401 at paras 2, 14,
285 ACWS (3d) 847.
75. Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44, s 19(2). Section 19(1) requires a
company “at all times” to “have a registered office in the province in Canada specified in its
articles” at which its corporate records must be maintained (ibid, s 20(1)). Federal legislation
governing federally regulated financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies
imposes a similar requirement but uses the term “head office.” See e.g. Bank Act, SC 1991,
c 46, s 237(1) (requiring that a bank “shall at all times have a head office in the province
specified in its incorporating instrument or by-laws”).
76. Supra note 3.
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Model Bill.77 The Civil Code of Quebec likewise adopts the traditional civilian
rule that the courts at the domicile of a defendant are empowered to exercise
general jurisdiction, defined in the case of a corporate defendant as its head office,
equivalent to its registered office.78
B. CENTRAL MANAGEMENT EXERCISED IN THE FORUM

The concept of “registered office” in section 7(a) is synonymous with a
corporation’s domicile at common law.79 The “registered office” of a corporation
may not always coincide in practice with its real domicile in the sense of the
place where its central management is localized. A corporation may elect to be
incorporated under the law of one jurisdiction for taxation or other pragmatic
reasons yet manage its business in an entirely different jurisdiction. If general
jurisdiction were instead confined to the corporation’s head office or registered
office, creditors would not be able to pursue their claims at the corporation’s real
home. Section 7(d)80 of the CJPTA addresses this reality by providing that the

77. Supra note 4.
78. Arts 75-76, 307 CCQ; CJPTA, supra note 6, s 7(a); Business Corporations Act, CQLR c
S-31.1, art 29. Article 75 of the Civil Code defines domicile as the place where a person has
their “principal establishment.” The concept of “principal establishment” is not synonymous
with residence but incorporates an additional element of intention. This is reflected in article
76, under which a change of domicile is effected by actual residence in another place coupled
with the intention of the person to make that place the seat of her principal establishment.
For corporations and other legal persons, however, article 307 sets out a separate definition,
locating domicile “at the place and address of its head office.” The term “head office”
is understood as equivalent to the term “registered office” in section 7(a) of the CJPTA
when read in conjunction with section 29 of the Quebec Business Corporations Act, under
which companies incorporated under the Act are required to have their “head office[s] …
permanently located in Québec.”
79. See National Trust, supra note 11; Gasque, supra note 11. Note that where the action relates
to the internal management and affairs of the company, jurisdiction is reserved exclusively to
the courts in its jurisdiction of incorporation. See also cases cited in supra note 13.
80. Note that section 8(c) parallels section 7(d) by deeming a partnership to be ordinarily
resident in the forum if its central management is exercised there. See CJPTA, supra note
6. Identifying the location of the central management of a partnership can be problematic
in cases where the partners are dispersed across multiple jurisdictions yet each is involved
in its management. For that reason, section 7 of the Saskatchewan CJPTA provides that a
partnership is ordinarily resident in Saskatchewan only if a partner is ordinarily resident there
or the partnership has a place of business there (See CJPTA, SK, supra note 6). The Alberta
Law Reform Institute and the Manitoba Law Reform Commission prefer the Saskatchewan
approach. See Alberta Law Reform Institute, Report No. 94, Enforcement of Judgments
(Edmonton: Alberta Law Reform Institute, 2008) at 31-32; Manitoba Law Reform
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forum court also has general jurisdiction over a company incorporated outside
the forum if its central management is exercised in the forum.81
A company that structures its affairs in this manner can reasonably expect
that the courts in both jurisdictions will have a sufficient interest to exercise
general jurisdiction over it. Accordingly, as with subsection 7(a), subsection
7(d) of the CJPTA is uncontroversial from a comparative and international
standpoint. As observed earlier, the place of central management of a corporation
also grounds general jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation and the 2017
Hague Draft Convention and Commonwealth Model Bill foreign judgment
recognition instruments.82
Like section 7(d), these international instruments recognize that for general
jurisdictional purposes, a corporation can have multiple domiciles or residences.
The problem of taking too narrow a view of a corporation’s home is illustrated
by the Civil Code of Quebec under which general jurisdiction is available only if
the defendant is domiciled in Quebec.83 It has been held that a person, whether
natural or legal, can have only one domicile at any given time.84 For personal
actions, the Civil Code enlarges the permissible bases of general jurisdiction to
include residence.85 However, residence-based jurisdiction is only available in
Quebec law for natural persons, as the Court of Appeal of Quebec has held that
legal persons are incapable of having a residence separate from their domicile.86
Article 3148(2) authorizes jurisdiction over corporations and other business

81.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Commission, Report No.119, Private International Law (Winnipeg: Statutory Publications,
2009) at 15-17.
There is not much developed analysis in the CJPTA case law on what is needed to show
that a corporation’s central management is exercised in the forum. See Wheatland Industrial
Park Inc, Re, 2013 BCSC 27 at para 49, 42 BCLR (5th) 177 [Wheatland] (summary
consideration); Stewart v Stewart, 2017 BCSC 1532 at paras 34-35, 100 BCLR (5th) 410;
Right Business Ltd v Affluent Public Ltd, 2011 BCSC 783 at paras 34-36, 40, 6 CPC (7th)
245, aff’d 2012 BCCA 375, 37 BCLR (5th) 101 [Right Business, BCCA].
Brussels I Regulation, supra note 2; Hague Draft Convention, supra note 3; Commonwealth
Model Bill, supra note 4.
Art 3141 CCQ.
See Herzog c Interinvest Consulting, 2009 QCCA 1428 at para 24, 179 ACWS (3d) 1088
[Interinvest]. The Quebec Court of Appeal confirmed that like a natural person, a legal
person can have only one domicile.
Art 3148 CCQ. Residence is defined as the place where a person “ordinarily” (English
version) or “habituellement” (French version) resides. See art 77 CCQ.
This interpretation first came from decisions applying the rule on security for costs that
could be imposed on a “non-resident” plaintiff. See Groupe Pages jaunes cie c Pitney Bowes du
Canada ltée, 2010 QCCA 368, 190 ACWS (3d) 988. This has recently been codified in art
492 of the new Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR c C-25.01.
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entities if the defendant possesses an “establishment” (i.e., place of business87) in
Quebec, but only if the dispute relates to the defendant’s activities in the province.
Contrary to the views of commentators, the Court of Appeal of Quebec has
endorsed a disjunctive reading of the two conditions, holding that the defendant’s
activity in Quebec need not be undertaken by or from the defendant’s place of
business in Quebec to found jurisdiction.88 The facts of the case giving rise to
that decision involved a company incorporated under Bermuda law but whose
central management was exercised in Quebec. The practical effect of the decision
on those facts was to vest the Quebec courts with equivalent jurisdiction to that
available under section 7(d) and the international instruments referred to above,
and this may have been influential to the Court of Appeal’s ruling.
C. PLACE OF BUSINESS IN THE FORUM

In treating a “place of business” in the forum as sufficient to constitute the “ordinary
residence” of a corporation, section 7(c)89 of the CJPTA codifies, or at least
approximates, the common law approach to general presence-based jurisdiction.
True, as noted in the introduction to this Part above, the CJPTA detaches
jurisdiction from procedural issues of service of process. A place of business in
the forum is sufficient for general jurisdiction regardless of whether the defendant
is served with process in the forum or ex juris. However, the defendant must
have a place of business in the forum at the time of the commencement of the
proceedings; evidence that it had a place of business there at some time in the past
is insufficient.90 While presence at the time of commencement of the proceedings
is not quite parallel to the common law rule which requires presence at the time
of service of process, this requirement nonetheless indicates that the theory
underlying general jurisdiction under section 7(b) is the traditional common law
view that the defendant’s physical “presence” in the forum at the time the forum
court’s adjudicatory power is invoked is sufficient for general jurisdiction.
87. While the notion of establishment is not defined in the Civil Code, courts have held that
it requires some form of stable physical presence such as a branch or office. See Interinvest,
supra note 83 at para 28.
88. Ibid at paras 40-41 (citing the broad interpretation of art 3148 CCQ endorsed by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Spar Aerospace Ltd v American Mobile Satellite Corp, 2002 SCC
78 at para 57-59, [2002] 4 SCR 205 [Spar]).
89. CJPTA, supra note 6 (sections 8(b) and 9(b) of the CJPTA parallel section 7(b)
for the purposes of determining the ordinary residence of partnerships and
unincorporated associations).
90. Knapp Consulting Inc v Continovation Services Inc, 2012 BCSC 887 at paras 21-24, 216
ACWS (3d) 630 [Knapp Consulting].
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The meaning of “place of business” has not been the subject of significant
elaboration. However, the decision in Borgstrom v Korean Air Lines91 is compatible
with the undemanding common law standard in Chevron. In that case, it was
held that the defendant airline had a place of business in British Columbia at
Vancouver International Airport because its airlines flew in and out of that
airport and it had ten employees at the airport to manage this activity.92
Clearly, a place cannot qualify as a “place of business” if the corporation
does not in fact carry on any business at that place.93 The reverse, however, is not
necessarily true. In Van Breda, the Court had suggested that regular visits to
the forum by the representatives of a corporation could constitute “carrying on
business” even if the defendant does not have a physical place of business in the
forum: “The notion of carrying on business requires some form of actual, not
only virtual, presence in the jurisdiction, such as maintaining an office there or
regularly visiting the territory of the particular jurisdiction.”94
Since the term “carrying on business” has the same meaning in both the
presence-based and presumptive jurisdiction contexts, it is conceivable that
presence-based general jurisdiction could exist at common law if a visiting
representative were served within the forum, provided the person served fitted
within the categories of representatives specified in the relevant rules of court
upon whom local service constituted service on the corporation.
General jurisdiction based on carrying on business in the forum in the absence
of a current physical place of business is not even a theoretical possibility under
the CJPTA. Only specific jurisdiction is available under section 10(h), which
presumes that jurisdiction based on a real and substantial connection between
91. Borgstrom v Korean Air Lines Co, 2006 BCSC 1690, 153 ACWS (3d) 576, rev’d on other
grounds 2007 BCCA 263, 70 BCLR (4th) 206 [Borgstrom].
92. Ibid at para 11. Note that the defendant ultimately succeeded, on forum non conveniens
grounds, in having the British Columbia action stayed in favour of the Korean courts
as the most appropriate forum. See Borgstrom v Korean Air Lines Co, 2007 BCSC 947,
159 ACWS (3d) 82.
93. Michael Mann, “Jurisdiction over a Foreign Company” (1955) 18:2 Mod L Rev 180 at 184.
Depending on the wording of the relevant rules of court for service of process, the courts
have sometimes used the expression “place of business” as a shorthand expression to denote
presence sufficient to found jurisdiction. See e.g. The Lord Advocate v Huron & Erie Loan and
Savings Co, [1911] 48 Scot LR 554, 1911 SLT 280 (Ct Sess).
94. Van Breda, supra note 27 at para 87 [emphasis added]. See also Essar Steel Algoma Inc, Re,
2016 ONSC 595, 33 CBR (6th) 313 [Essar]. In Essar, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
cited Van Breda in support of its ruling that regular visits by representatives of a foreign
company to the forum were sufficient to constitute “carrying on business” for the purposes of
assumed jurisdiction.
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the facts giving rise to the proceeding and the forum exists if the subject matter of
the claim “concerns a business carried on” in the forum.95 In interpreting section
10(h), courts have considered the presence of a physical office in the forum at the
time of the events giving rise to the dispute as relevant to the determination of
whether the claim “concerns a business carried on in the forum” even though the
defendant no longer had a physical office in the province when the proceeding
was commenced.96 However, unlike “carrying on business” as a presumptive
connecting factor under the Van Breda framework, specific jurisdiction under
section 10(h) is not derived from common law presence-based jurisdiction.
It therefore does not depend on the defendant’s physical presence in the forum
at the time of the proceeding, but on whether the business alleged to be carried
on by the corporation in the forum in the past bears a subject-matter connection
to the dispute. Provided some connection is present, this frees courts to adopt
a far more expansive approach to what constitutes “carrying on business.” Thus,
it has been held that the defendant’s physical presence in the forum, whether in
the form of a place of business or regular visits by representatives, is not required
to establish that the claim “concerns a business carried on in the forum” under
section 10(h).97
In contrast to section 7(c) of the CJPTA and the common law, the presence
of a physical place of business in the forum is insufficient to ground general
jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation and the 2017 Hague Draft Convention
and Commonwealth Model Bill foreign judgment recognition instruments unless
it is the defendant’s principal place of business.98 Moreover, in contrast to section
10(h) of the CJPTA which does not require any physical presence to ground
specific jurisdiction where the claim concerns “a business carried on” in the forum,
specific jurisdiction under these international instruments is available only if the
dispute arose out of the activities or operations of “a branch, agency or other
establishment” established by the corporation in the foreign judgment forum.99
The meaning of “principal place of business” in these instruments for the
purposes of general jurisdiction could be understood in the abstract as referring
95. Knapp Consulting, supra note 90 at para 26. The wording of section 10(h) of the CJPTA
is somewhat ambiguous, but it is accepted that it requires the subject matter of the claim
to concern a business carried on by the defendant in the forum at some point. See also
MicroCoal Inc v Livneh, 2014 BCSC 787 at paras 87-88, 240 ACWS (3d) 608.
96. Knapp Consulting, supra note 90 at para 26.
97. Bier v Continental Motors, Inc, 2016 BCSC 1393 at paras 53-60, 240 ACWS (3d) 608.
98. Brussels I Regulation, supra note 2; Hague Draft Convention, supra note 3; Commonwealth
Model Bill, supra note 4.
99. CJPTA, supra note 6, s 10(h).
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either to the place of central management of a business or to the place where the
defendant’s principal business is conducted. Of course, this will often be at the
same place, but it could be that a business entity carries out its principal business
in a different place than the one where it manages its affairs or under whose laws
it is incorporated. In the context of the Brussels I Regulation, it has been held that
the connecting factors of “statutory seat,” place of “central administration,” and
“principal place of business” are to be differentiated, leaving open the availability
of as many as three venues for the exercise of general jurisdiction.100
D. REGISTERED ADDRESS OR AGENT FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS IN THE
FORUM

Under section 7(b), a corporation is also considered to be ordinarily resident
in the forum so as to vest general jurisdiction if it has “pursuant to law”
registered an address or nominated an agent in the forum at which or upon
which process may be served generally.101 This provision is understood to refer to
provincial laws requiring an extra-provincial corporation “carrying on business”
in the enacting province to register and appoint a local agent or attorney for the
purposes of service of process in local proceedings.102 These statutory regimes
vary considerably, including in the definition of what constitutes “carrying on
business.” That said, the typical statutory formulation begins by listing specific
acts of a corporation that are deemed to constitute carrying on business in the
forum and then concludes with a catch-all reference to “or otherwise carries
on business in the forum.”103 The concept is thus not confined to the already
100. Young v Anglo American South Africa Ltd (No 2), [2014] EWCA Civ 1130 at para 39,
[2014] Bus LR 1434:
What then is the correct interpretation of the words “central administration” in article 60(1)
(b) bearing in mind that it is one of three alternatives possible “domiciles” of a company for the
purposes of the Regulation. Article 60 contemplates the possibility that a company’s “statutory
seat”, its “central administration” and its “principal place of business” could be in the same or in
different locations. In my view, the draftsman of article 60 also plainly contemplated that the
three attributes of the company set out in article 60(1)(a), (b) and (c) were to be differentiated.
Thus … [t]he third [possible alternative domicile] is the place where the company does its
principal “business”. Where that is must be a question of fact in each case.

101. See e.g. Hans v Volvo Trucks North America Inc, 2010 BCSC 1700 at para 32, 2 CPC (7th)
149; Chalmers (Litigation Guardian of ) v AMO Canada Co, 2009 BCSC 689 at para 68, 178
ACWS (3d) 313; Formula Contractors Ltd v Lafarge Canada Inc, 2009 BCSC 105 at para 11,
174 ACWS (3d) 712; Hudye Farms Inc v Canadian Wheat Board, 2011 SKCA 137 at para
15, 342 DLR (4th) 659; Borgstrom, supra note 91.
102. See e.g. BCBCA, supra note 72, ss 375-76, 386.
103. See e.g. ibid, s 375(2).
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very broad common law concept of “carrying on business” for the purposes of
presence-based jurisdiction, but can include, for example, such acts as simply
listing the corporation’s name in a local telephone directory or having it appear
in “any advertisement” with a local address or telephone number.104
An extra-provincial company that carries on business in the forum in the
manner contemplated by these statutes but does not register and appoint an agent
for service is not ordinarily resident in the forum under section 7(b). Section 7(b)
applies only if the corporation has in fact registered. It is insufficient that it may
have been required “pursuant to law” to do so.105 In the latter scenario, general
jurisdiction will be available only if the defendant is ordinarily resident in the
forum under some other criterion in section 7.
On the other hand, if an extra-provincial company does register, courts
have accepted uncritically that section 7(b) per se confers general jurisdiction.106
It is irrelevant that the company was not in fact carrying on business in the
forum when the action was commenced or indeed whether it ever carried on any
business there. This is a rather astonishing proposition. After all, failure to register
can expose an extra-provincial company to heavy fines; for example, the penalty
in British Columbia is one hundred dollars for each day that a company carries
on business without being registered.107 To avoid the risk of a fine, and in view
of the uncertain meaning of what constitutes carrying on business, companies
may often make a precautionary filing even though they are not carrying on
any significant business in the forum. Or they may register in anticipation of
doing business in the forum at some future time without yet having carried
out that intention. To say that the mere act of registration nonetheless confers
general jurisdiction over suits arising out of that company’s activities anywhere
in the world is excessive by any standard. Yet that is what the plain wording of
section 7(b) directs.
104. Ibid.
105. This is evident from the wording of section 7(b) compared to section 7(a) of the CJPTA.
See Black, Pitel & Sobkin, supra note 69 at 80-81 (the authors note the confusion in
Moore v NextEnergy Inc, 2012 BCSC 458 at paras 36-45, 217 ACWS (3d) 82). See
also Right Business, BCCA, supra note 81 at paras 89-93; Wheatland, supra note 81 at
para 49 (unfortunately, the British Columbia courts have continued to assume that an
extra-provincial company that “carries on business” in the forum in the sense contemplated
by the extra-provincial corporate registration regime is subject to jurisdiction under section
7(b) even if it has not registered).
106. Conor Pacific Group Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 BCCA 222 at paras 8-13,
32 BCLR (5th) 356.
107. BCBCA, supra note 72, ss 426(1)(b), 428(3); Business Corporation Regulation,
BC Reg 65/2004, s 35.
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In this respect, the CJPTA would seem to represent a sharp departure from
the prior common law. In several pre-CJPTA decisions, the British Columbia
courts doubted that registration as an extra-provincial company was sufficient
to confer jurisdiction in the absence of any connections between the claim and
the forum,108 citing the 1912 decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal
in Pearlman v Great West Life Assurance Co.109 In that case, the court rejected
the proposition that an extra-provincial corporation served at its registered
local address could be considered resident or present in the province so as to
support the exercise of presence-based jurisdiction over a cause of action that was
entirely localized outside of British Columbia. The purpose of the registration
requirement was “for the protection of creditors of the Company in this Province,
and to enable the Company to sue and be sued in respect of business transacted
in this Province.”110 Consequently, registration, at best, conferred jurisdiction
only in relation to claims that arose out of business done by the extra-provincial
company in the province.111
108. Procon Mining & Tunnelling Ltd v Waddy Lake Resources Ltd, 2002 BCSC 129 at para 35,
[2002] BCTC 129; Columbia Trust Co v Skalbania (1991), 68 BCLR (2d) 353, [1992]
5 WWR 216 (SC). There is also Ontario authority holding that mere registration as an
extra-provincial corporation does not suffice for presence-based jurisdiction if the defendant
does not have a place of business in the province. See Essex Garments Canada Inc v Cohen
(2005), 145 ACWS (3d) 814 at para 19, 22 CPC (6th) 64 (Ont Sup Ct) [Essex]. However,
the defendant in Essex was a federal company with a registered head office in Manitoba
and Ontario does not require extra-provincial companies incorporated under federal law
with a registered office in another province, or incorporated under the law of another
province, to appoint a local agent to accept service of process. Accordingly, common law
presence-based jurisdiction is available in Ontario only if the extra-provincial company has
a physical place of business in Ontario on which in juris service of process may be effected
pursuant to rule 16.02(1)(c). See Ontario Rules, supra note 44.
109. Pearlman (Pearson) v Great West Life Insurance Co (1912), 17 BCR 417 at 419, 4 DLR 154
(CA) [Pearlman].
110. Ibid at 421.
111. All members of the panel of the British Columbia Court of Appeal agreed that registration
was insufficient to give the British Columbia courts general jurisdiction over claims
unrelated to the defendant’s business in the forum. However, Chief Justice Macdonald
doubted that an extra-provincial company registered to do business in the province should
thereby automatically be considered, even for business done in the province, to be carrying
on business here for the purposes of establishing the jurisdiction of the British Columbia
courts. Ibid at 419. Justice Martin, on the other hand, thought that when an extra-provincial
company “has taken out a licence ‘authorizing it to carry on business within this Province’ …
it is too … late for it to contend that as a fact it is not ‘carrying on business’ here, and a wide
interpretation should be given to that expression” (ibid at 421-22). The other justices did not
address this issue.
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In Pearlman, as the court observed, there was nothing in the extra-provincial
registration provisions showing it was the intention of the legislature “to confer
any extraordinary jurisdiction on the Courts, or to make the Company liable to
process except in respect of their British Columbia business.”112 In contrast, the
plain language of section 7(b) of the CJPTA quite clearly makes registration per
se sufficient to establish general jurisdiction, even if the defendant is not, in fact,
doing any business in the forum, or not doing sufficient business there to satisfy
the test for common law corporate presence formulated in Chevron.
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court of Canada in Chevron left the door
open to the argument that the real and substantial connection principle as a
constitutional limit on the exercise of adjudicatory power may on other facts
constrain presence-based jurisdiction. If a foreign company does not, in fact,
carry on business in the forum sufficient to make it “present” within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, the exercise of jurisdiction under section 7(b) based
solely on registration as an extra-provincial company very arguably is open
to challenge on that principle. The constitutional dimension of the real and
substantial connection principle in the Canadian context is said to derive from
the territorial limits on provincial legislative competence and on the authority of
the courts under section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.113 Citing Van Breda, the
Court in Chevron stated that this principle requires that the connection between
the forum and the dispute cannot be so “weak or hypothetical” as to “cast doubt
upon the legitimacy of the exercise of state power over the persons affected by the
dispute.”114 One can quarrel with the Court’s conclusory ruling in Chevron that it
is not constitutionally illegitimate to found general jurisdiction on the traditional
common law basis of presence over a corporation that “has elected to establish
and continue to operate a place of business” within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court at which it is served with process.115 But even accepting that conclusion,
it is difficult to see how registration by an extra-provincial company of a local
address or agent for service of process per se could give it a sufficient presence
within the territorial jurisdiction of the forum to support the constitutionally
legitimate exercise of general jurisdiction. To so hold would make the notion of
territorial limits on a court’s authority illusory.

112. Ibid at 421.
113. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 92, reprinted in RSC 1985,
Appendix II, No 5.
114. Chevron, supra note 33 at para 88, citing Van Breda, supra note 27 at para 32.
115. Chevron, supra note 33 at para 89.
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It has been suggested that when an extra-provincial company registers to
do business in the forum, it has in some sense thereby consented or submitted
to the jurisdiction of the forum court.116 This theory arguably would make the
exercise of general jurisdiction under section 7(b) constitutionally permissible,
not because of the defendant’s in-forum presence, but rather its submission to
the exercise of authority by forum courts over its activities. A defendant’s consent
or submission to jurisdiction in a dispute undoubtedly confers the necessary
legitimacy on a court’s exercise of adjudicatory power regardless of whether the
dispute bears any connection to the forum. But it defies logic and language to say
that when an extra-provincial company registers and appoints a local agent for
service of process, it can be taken as having impliedly submitted to the exercise
of jurisdiction by the local courts over its activities anywhere in the world. The
widely acknowledged purpose of requiring extra-provincial companies that do
business in the province to register implies at most concession to the authority of
local courts over disputes arising out of its local business. Even that proposition
requires assigning an artificial meaning to the notion of consent since, as noted
earlier, extra-provincial companies often make a precautionary registration
to avoid the risk of penalties in view of the typically broad and open-ended
definition of what constitutes carrying on business under these extra-provincial
registration statutes.117
The “consent by registration” theory of general jurisdiction has attracted
considerable attention in US jurisprudence and literature in the wake of the recent
rejection by the Supreme Court of the United States of the availability of general
jurisdiction based solely on a corporation’s “doing business” in the forum.118
Most commentators have rejected the theory for the reasons already stated. True
consent- or submission-based jurisdiction is: dispute-specific (whereas registration
at best signifies consent only in relation to disputes arising out of the defendant’s
activities in the forum) and voluntary (whereas the act of registration is coerced in
the sense that failure to register typically exposes the out of state corporation to

116. Black, Pitel & Sobkin, supra note 69 at 78.
117. See also Lord Collins of Mapesbury et al, eds, Dicey, Morris, & Collins on the Conflict of Laws,
15th ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) vol 1. This edition explains:
[T]o say that a corporation which, under the threat of heavy fine, files with the Registrar of Companies
… thereby submits to the jurisdiction seems even more artificial than saying that a corporation
which establishes a place of business in England is deemed to be present in England (ibid at 425).

118. See Part III, below.
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civil incapacities and other penalties).119 The analysis in the US context focuses on
the weakness and artificiality of the registration-by-consent theory in the context
of the jurisdictional constraints imposed by the due process requirements of the
US Constitution. The same criticisms apply in the Canadian context insofar as
the purpose of the territorially-based constitutional constraints on provincial
authority is to ensure the legitimate exercise of provincial adjudicatory power.
The consent-by-registration theory of general jurisdiction has not yet been
the subject of a ruling by the US Supreme Court.120 To date, it has received a
mixed reception in lower courts. It has, for example, been rejected by district
courts in some circuits,121 but accepted in others, albeit based on statutory
wording that specifically advised that registration constituted the registrant’s
consent to jurisdiction.122

III. LIMITING COMMON LAW GENERAL JURISDICTION TO
A CORPORATION’S “HOME” FORUM: THE RECENT US
JURISPRUDENCE
For many years, US courts recognized a kind of presence-based general
jurisdiction over out-of-state and foreign country corporations. Under what was
variously referred to as the “corporate presence” and “doing business” doctrine,
a suit could be brought against a corporation that had substantial “continuous
and systematic” business contacts with the forum state, even though the cause
of action arose from activities that were entirely unrelated to those contacts.123
While there was considerable variation in the jurisprudence of different state
courts on what constituted sufficiently substantial contacts, the few US Supreme
Court decisions in which the matter was addressed seemed to accept that doing
119. See generally Craig Sanders, “Of Carrots and Sticks: General Jurisdiction and Genuine
Consent” (2017) 111:5 Nw UL Rev 1323; Tanya J Monestier, “Registration Statutes,
General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent” (2015) 36:4 Cardozo L Rev 1343; Edward
D Cavanagh, “General Jurisdiction 2.0: The Updating and Uprooting of the Corporate
Presence Doctrine” (2016) 68:2 Me L Rev 287 at 308-14; Monestier, “Jurisdiction over
Corporations,” supra note 43 at 167-68, n 42. See also Kevin D Benish, “Pennoyer’s Ghost:
Consent, Registration Statutes, and General Jurisdiction after Daimler AG v. Bauman”
(2015) 90:5 NYUL Rev 1609.
120. The US Supreme Court declined to rule on the point because the Montana Supreme
Court had not addressed the question. See BNSF Ry Co v Tyrrell, 137 S Ct 1549 at 1553
(2017) [BNSF Ry Co].
121. Famular v Whirlpool Corp, 16 CV 944 (VB) (SDNY 2017).
122. Bors v Johnson & Johnson, 208 F Supp (3d) 648 at 652 (ED Pa 2016).
123. Cavanagh, supra note 119 at 302.
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business in the forum on a continuous and systematic basis was an acceptable
basis for general jurisdiction.124
All that changed with the 2011 decision of the US Supreme Court in
Goodyear.125 In delivering the opinion of the court, Justice Ginsburg concluded
that a state court could assert general jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations
only if their affiliations were “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them
essentially at home in the forum State.”126 Three years later, in Daimler,127 Justice
Ginsburg confirmed (on behalf of an 8-to-1 majority) that a corporation’s
place of incorporation or its principal place of business (i.e., place of central
administration)128 constituted the paradigmatic connections needed to satisfy
the “at home” standard.129 Engaging in “substantial, continuous, and systematic”
business activities in the forum was insufficient to support general jurisdiction
if the dispute did not arise out of those activities. Further, the US Supreme
Court’s citation in its earlier decisions to cases upholding the exercise of general
jurisdiction based on the corporation “doing business” from a local office in the
forum state “should not attract heavy reliance today.”130
In the wake of the Court’s narrowing of general jurisdiction in Goodyear
and Daimler, it was speculated that US state courts would be inclined to push
the boundaries of specific jurisdiction. That expectation materialized when the
California Supreme Court, in its Bristol-Myers Squibb decision,131 ruled that it
had specific jurisdiction over non-resident plaintiffs in a tort class action suit
against a pharmaceutical manufacturer in California even though their alleged
injuries had been suffered in their home states, and none of the conduct giving
rise to their claims had occurred in California. On appeal, the US Supreme Court
reversed, ruling that the jurisdiction of the California courts was limited to the
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Ibid at 301-03.
Goodyear, supra note 1.
Ibid at 919 [emphasis added].
Daimler, supra note 1.
The Court cited Hertz Corporation v Friend, 559 US 77 (2010), when referring to the
defendant’s “principal place of business” in both Goodyear and Daimler, in which it had
defined a corporation’s principal place of business for the purposes of diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction as its “nerve center,” i.e., the place where managers “direct, control, and
coordinate the corporation’s activities” as opposed to the place of its principal activities
(ibid at 92-93). The term thus appears to equate with the “place of central administration”
connecting factor used in the CJPTA and in international instruments. See supra notes 3-5
and accompanying text.
129. Daimler, supra note 1 at 760.
130. Ibid at 761, n 18.
131. Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v Superior Court, 1 Cal (5th) 783 (S Ct 2016).
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California plaintiffs injured in California.132 In language that would not be out of
place in a Canadian constitutional context, the US Supreme Court emphasized
that “restrictions on personal jurisdiction ‘are more than a guarantee of immunity
from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial
limitations on the power of the respective States’”133 and the “sovereign power”
of each State to try causes in its courts implies “a limitation on the sovereignty of
all its sister States.”134 Consequently,
“[e]ven if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being
forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State … [and] even if the forum
State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting
as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its
power to render a valid judgment.”135

In subsequent decisions, the US Supreme Court has unequivocally confirmed
that it meant what it said in Daimler. Decided in 2017, BNSF Ry Co v Tyrrell 136
involved claims instituted in Montana under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act
(“FELA”) for personal injuries sustained by employees of the defendant railroad
company in states other than Montana. The defendant was incorporated in
Delaware and had its principal place of business in Texas. The Montana Supreme
Court held that it could exercise general jurisdiction since FELA provided that
claims could be brought in any state where the defendant is “doing business.”
The US Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg ruled
that the FELA provision did not state a rule of jurisdiction but merely provided a
venue if jurisdiction was otherwise available. Justice Ginsburg then reiterated the
Daimler ruling that the “paradigm” forums in which a corporation is subject to
general jurisdiction are the corporation’s place of incorporation and its principal
place of business.
Daimler brings the law on general jurisdiction in the United States much
closer to the European and international approaches referred to earlier in the
article, and conversely moves it much further from the CJPTA and Canadian
common law. Indeed, the US Supreme Court cited considerations of comity
and international harmonization as influential in its tightening of the bases
132. Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v Superior Court of California, San Francisco County, 137 S Ct
1773 (2017) [Bristol-Myers 2017].
133. Ibid at 1780, quoting Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235 at 251 (1958) [emphasis added].
134. Bristol-Myers 2017, supra note 132, citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson, 444 US
286 at 293 (1980) [World-Wide Volkswagen].
135. Bristol-Myers 2017, supra note 132 at 1780-81, citing World-Wide Volkswagen, supra note 134
at 294 [emphasis added].
136. BNSF Ry Co, supra note 120.
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for exercising general jurisdiction.137 While these considerations have obvious
resonance in the Canadian context, it is instructive to consider the extent to
which the other justifications underlying the US Supreme Court’s conclusion are
also transferable.
Consider first the US Supreme Court’s observation that there was no need
for an expansive theory of general jurisdiction given that the available bases
of specific jurisdiction, in the wake of the US Supreme Court’s decision in
International Shoe Co v Washington,138 had been sufficiently enlarged to eliminate
the need to adopt a broad theory of general jurisdiction to allow “plaintiffs
access to a reasonable forum in cases when specific jurisdiction would deny
it.”139 This justification has even greater resonance in the Canadian context. The
Supreme Court has adopted a very liberal approach to the determination of what
constitutes a sufficiently “real and substantial” presumptive connecting factor to
found assumed jurisdiction at common law.140 In common law jurisdictions that
have adopted the CJPTA, section 10(h) sets out a long list of broadly formulated
and broadly interpreted presumptive “real and substantial connection” bases for
specific jurisdiction.141 And the Quebec courts have endorsed a liberal reading

137. Daimler, supra note 1 at 763.
138. International Shoe, supra note 1.
139. See Daimler, supra note 1 at 757-58, n 9, citing Patrick J Borchers, “The Problem with
General Jurisdiction” (2000) 2001:1 U Chicago Legal F 119 (“general jurisdiction exists
as an imperfect safety valve that sometimes allows plaintiffs access to a reasonable forum in
cases when specific jurisdiction would deny it” at 139). See also Daimler, supra note 1 at
755-58; 762, n 20.
140. As observed earlier, the Van Breda presumptive connecting factor of “carrying on business”
in the forum was given a liberal interpretation in the case itself, and the subsequent case law
has confirmed and arguably taken an even more liberal approach. See the text accompanying
note 54. The same is true of the presumptive connecting factor of “a contract connected
to the dispute” made in the forum. See Lapointe, supra note 58. See also Toews v Grand
Palladium Vallarta Resort & Spa, 2016 ABCA 408, 408 DLR (4th) 282, leave to appeal to
SCC refused, 37450 (18 May 2017). The presumptive connecting factor of a tort committed
in the forum has also been given a broad “contextual” interpretation. See e.g. Gulevich v
Miller, 2015 ABCA 411, 393 DLR (4th) 304.
141. See the discussion of section 10(h) in Part II, above.
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of the statutory connecting factors for jurisdiction in the Civil Code under the
influence of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Spar.142
Consider next the US Supreme Court’s concern with unpredictability
for corporations having a presence in multiple jurisdictions owing to the
considerable variation in state jurisprudence on what constituted a sufficiently
proximate business presence in a state to support general jurisdiction.143 This
concern is equally acute in the Canadian common law and CJPTA contexts. For
all the reasons discussed in Part I, above, the uncertainty surrounding the outer
boundaries of “carrying on business” for the purposes of both presence-based
general jurisdiction and assumed jurisdiction in the common law context
promises to be a fruitful source of litigation in the years to come in both the
domestic jurisdiction and foreign judgment recognition contexts. The scope of
general jurisdiction under the CJPTA is marginally less uncertain since, as noted
in Part II of the article, section 7(c) of the CJPTA at least confirms that the
corporation must be “carrying on business” at a physical place of business in
the forum to be considered ordinarily resident there. On the other hand, as also
discussed in Part II, carrying on business as a basis for specific jurisdiction under
section 10(h) of the CJPTA has been given a generous interpretation so as not to
require the corporation to have any physical presence in the forum, in contrast to
the international standards for specific jurisdiction. Moreover, as further observed
in Part II, the constitutional legitimacy of exercising general jurisdiction over
extra-provincial companies based solely on registration of an address or agent
for service in the forum under section 7(b) is controversial, particularly if the
company does not in fact carry on business in the forum to an extent sufficient to
make it “present” there in the common law sense of presence-based jurisdiction
as articulated in Chevron.
Consider also the US Supreme Court’s concerns with the need to constrain
forum shopping.144 This is perceived as problematic in the United States for a
142. For example, the Quebec Court of Appeal has twice upheld jurisdiction under the “injury
… suffered in Québec” connecting factor in article 3148(3) in claims for personal injury
suffered abroad, where the victim returns to Quebec and continues to suffer from the initial
foreign injury. See D’Amours c Transat Tours Canada inc, 2007 QCCA 418, [2007] RJQ 550;
Nosseir v Vacances Transat Holidays inc, 2009 QCCA 2182, 2009 JQ no 13825 (QL). This
was premised on the Supreme Court of Canada’s emphasis that article 3148(3) provides a
“broad basis for finding jurisdiction.” See Spar, supra note 88 at paras 57-59.
143. Daimler, supra note 1 at 759-60. See also Monestier, “Where Is Home Depot,” supra
note 1 at 258-59.
144. Daimler, supra note 1 at 757, 760-61. See also Monestier, “Where Is Home Depot,” supra
note 1 at 259-60.
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variety of reasons.145 First, there is considerable disharmony in the choice of law
approaches applied by courts in the various states with the result that a plaintiff’s
choice of forum can sometimes result in the application of a more favourable
substantive law to the merits. Second, even if the substantive law is the same in
all possible fora, state courts often apply their own internal limitations statutes to
a claim, thereby encouraging plaintiffs pursuing stale claims to shop for a forum
with a generous limitation period. Third, there can be considerable variation
in the standards of liability and damages awarded for similar conduct owing to
variations in the makeup and plaintiff-friendly disposition of juries from one
state to the next.
These specific forum-shopping considerations have somewhat less resonance
in the Canadian context: juries are either unavailable or not utilized in civil law
claims,146 choice of law approaches are largely harmonious,147 and claimants
generally cannot rely on a longer forum limitation period if the claim is barred
by the limitations statute of the jurisdiction whose law applies to the merits of
the claim.148 That said, a theory of general jurisdiction that entitles a plaintiff to
bring claims anywhere that a corporation carries on business, however remote
that place may be from the subject matter of the dispute, undoubtedly offers
ample opportunity for litigants to select a forum for strategic (e.g., to force a
settlement) or other reasons having little to do with the merits of the claim.149
Moreover, since “carrying on business” in the forum also gives presumptive, albeit
rebuttable, general jurisdiction in assumed jurisdiction cases under the Van Breda
145. See Lea Brilmayer et al, “A General Look at General Jurisdiction” (1988) 66:4 Tex L Rev 721
at 725. See also Allan R Stein, “Frontiers of Jurisdiction: From Isolation to Connectedness”
(2000) 2001:1 U Chicago Legal F 373 at 384-86.
146. WA Bogart, “‘Guardian of Civil Rights … Medieval Relic’: The Civil Jury in Canada” (1999)
62:2 Law & Contemp Probs 305.
147. The most notable exceptions arise in tort cases. See e.g. Tolofson v Jensen, [1994] 3 SCR 1022,
120 DLR (4th) 289. The Supreme Court of Canada endorsed the general application of the
lex loci delicti for common law jurisdictions. The Civil Code of Quebec sets out two notable
exceptions: (1) article 3128 provides a special victim-protective alternative choice of law rule
for products liability cases; and (2) article 3126 provides for the application of the parties’
home law where the victim and the defendant have a common domicile or residence in the
same state. See arts 3126, 3128 CCQ.
148. While the rules in the various Canadian provinces and territories on the law applicable to
limitation periods (prescription) are not entirely uniform, forum shopping is not a problem
since claimants generally cannot rely on a longer limitation period if the claim is barred
under the limitation statute of the jurisdiction whose law is applicable to the merits. See
Stephen GA Pitel et al, Private International Law in Common Law Canada: Cases, Text and
Materials, 4th ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2016) at 592-602.
149. See Monestier, “Jurisdiction over Corporations,” supra note 43 at 623.
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framework, the potential for forum-shopping is not limited to cases where the
corporation is amenable to local service of process under the forum’s service rules.
Consider finally the concern that a broad theory of general jurisdiction affects
different categories of defendants differently, exposing large corporations with a
country-wide business presence to the risk of litigation in all states in which they
carry on business.150 While that concern also resonates in the Canadian context,
there is the countervailing consideration, emphasized in Justice Sotomayor’s
minority opinion in Daimler, that the effect of the majority ruling would be
to require individual plaintiffs injured outside their home state by the activities
of a large multistate or multinational corporation to pursue the defendant in
its home forum or in the state of injury, depriving them of recourse to local
courts for relief.151
Justice Sotomayor was also the dissenting voice in the US Supreme Court’s
subsequent decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb.152 In ruling that the California
courts lacked specific jurisdiction over the claims of non-resident plaintiffs, she
saw the court as essentially allowing “territorial limitations on the power of the
respective States” to trump “fair play and substantial justice.”153 As in Daimler,
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent was rooted in concerns with access to justice. The
ruling would limit the choice of fora for plaintiffs seeking to aggregate claims in
mass tort claims (i.e., class actions) to the defendant’s home state and might even
make such claims impossible where the action is against two or more defendants
incorporated or with a principal place of business in different states.
Whatever relevance Justice Sotomayor’s concerns with access to justice may
have in the US context, they simply do not resonate in Canada. As emphasized
above, Canadian jurisdictional law—whether rooted in the common law,
the CJPTA, or the Civil Code—has embraced such an expansive approach to
“specific” jurisdiction as to eliminate any need to preserve a broad theory of
general jurisdiction based on corporate presence. The concluding analysis that
follows elaborates on this point.

150. Daimler, supra note 1 at 760-61. The case mentions that:
Plaintiffs would have us look beyond the exemplar bases Goodyear identified, and approve
the exercise of general jurisdiction in every State in which a corporation “engages in a
substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business.” That formulation, we hold,
is unacceptably grasping.

151. Ibid at 773.
152. Bristol-Myers 2017, supra note 132.
153. Ibid at 1788.
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IV. CONCLUSION
As we have seen, international instruments reserve general jurisdiction to the state
in which the defendant corporation’s registered office, centre of administration,
or principal activities are located (where these are distributed among several
jurisdictions).154 The mere establishment of a place of business in the forum vests
only specific jurisdiction, i.e., only in relation to disputes specifically related to
the corporation’s forum activities. This is in contrast to the traditional common
law concept of presence-based jurisdiction, under which the establishment
of a place of business and the sustained carrying on of business in the forum
when served in juris vests general jurisdiction over a corporate defendant, i.e.,
even in unrelated disputes.155 While the Supreme Court of the United States
has narrowed the availability of general jurisdiction over corporate defendants
at common law to bring it closer in line with the international standard,156 the
Supreme Court of Canada has declined to follow that lead.157 And while the
CJPTA uses the concept of “ordinary residence” for general jurisdiction, it defines
“ordinary residence” for corporations and other business entities in a manner that
preserves, and even exceeds, the common law approach.158
The persistence of a broad theory of presence-based general jurisdiction
for corporate defendants not just at common law but also under the CJPTA
is puzzling. While the Supreme Court of Canada in Chevron emphasized the
long historical roots of traditional common law presence-based jurisdiction,159
it offered little in the way of principled justification, relying instead on conclusory
statements that it is “reasonable” for a corporation that establishes and continues
to operate a place of business in the forum to expect someday to be sued there
and for that courts of that jurisdiction to take an interest in its affairs.160 These
assumptions have resonance where the specific dispute relates to the defendant’s
forum activities, but they are unpersuasive where the subject matter of the dispute
relates to events and activities that occur elsewhere in the country or abroad.
As observed in Part III, access to justice concerns underpinned Justice
Sotomayor’s objections to the rejection of a broad concept of general jurisdiction
in the US context, particularly in combination with a complementary tightening
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
See Part I, above, for more on this topic.
See Part III, above, for more on this topic.
See Part I, above, for more on this topic.
See Part II, above, for more on this topic.
Chevron, supra note 33 at para 83.
Ibid at para 89.
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of specific jurisdiction. As Part III concluded, the latter concern does not
resonate in the Canadian context. Although Van Breda purported to tighten the
bases for “real and substantial connection” assumed jurisdiction in service ex juris
cases at common law, the courts have adopted a generous interpretation to the
presumptive connecting factors endorsed in that case, permitting them to retain
jurisdiction where access to justice considerations are present.161
Indeed, as observed in Part I, and consistent with its origins in presence-based
jurisdiction in service in juris cases, “carrying on business” as a presumptive
connecting factor under the Van Breda framework does not require a connection
between the subject-matter of the dispute and the forum; the absence of such a
connection is merely a basis on which the presumption of jurisdiction may be
rebutted.162 In determining whether the presumption has been rebutted, the courts
have exercised restraint in balancing access to justice concerns with protection of
large multinational corporations from being hauled into court in a forum that is
a world away from the events giving rise to the dispute.163 Nonetheless, “carrying
on business” has been interpreted as sufficient to vest jurisdiction under the Van
Breda framework even where the connection between the subject matter of the
dispute and the forum is tenuous,164 and even though the degree of corporate
presence in the forum is contestable.165 Tellingly, this has tended to happen in
cases where the access to justice concerns articulated by Justice Sotomayor in
the US context are present: claims by individual plaintiffs in their home forum
against a large national or multinational company arising from the company’s out
of province or out of country activities,166 and class action proceedings.167
In the CJPTA context, we saw in Part II that common law presence-based
general jurisdiction has been preserved in section 7(c) but without regard to
whether service is effected within the jurisdiction or ex juris, and in section 7(b)
even if the defendant is not actually carrying on business there when the action is
commenced provided it has registered a local agent for service of process. While
general jurisdiction under section 7(c) at least requires that the corporation have
a physical place of business in the forum, it was observed in Part II that specific
jurisdiction under section 10(h) is available if the dispute relates to business
carried on in the forum by the corporation, even if it has never had any physical
161. See Part I, above; supra note 140.
162. The same is true of the presumptive connecting factors of “domicile or “residence” which are
also bases for common law presence-based general jurisdiction in service in juris cases.
163. See Kornhaber v Starwood Hotels, 2014 ONSC 6182, 246 ACWS (3d) 567.
164. See e.g. Pedwell v Snc-Lavalin Inc, 2014 ABQB 309, [2014] AWLD 3336 [Pedwell].
165. See e.g. Budd, supra note 49.
166. Pedwell, supra note 164.
167. Budd, supra note 49.
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presence there whether in the form of a physical office or visits by representatives
of the corporation. The adoption of a generous approach to specific jurisdiction
under section 10(h) similarly operates to preserve access to local justice for
local plaintiffs, notwithstanding that section 10(h) would not be sufficient for
specific jurisdiction under international standards which requires that the dispute
relate to the activities of the corporation at a physical branch or establishment
in the forum.168
It is true that the common law and CJPTA approach to general jurisdiction
provides access to local justice for individuals who are injured by the activities
of a national corporation while visiting another province or who move to a new
province after the occurrence of the relevant events. Yet access is by no means
assured given that courts retain the discretion to stay proceedings under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. Moreover, the burden and inconvenience
for the corporate defendant is not the only concern to be weighed. A broad
theory of general jurisdiction greatly expands the potential for courts in multiple
jurisdictions to claim adjudicatory authority over disputes arising from events
and activities occurring wholly outside their borders. The more restrained
international standard better addresses the interest of all jurisdictions in mutually
respecting the territorial limitations on the reach of their courts. Claimants are still
assured of a reasonable choice of litigation venues insofar as general jurisdiction
is not limited to the courts at the corporation’s ‘birth place’ but extends to the
courts at the place of central management of its affairs and the place where it
carries out its principal business.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Chevron signals that
implementation of the more restrained international standard for general
jurisdiction is unlikely to come from the courts. Whether the CJPTA legislators
or for that matter legislators in the common law provinces are willing to reform
their jurisdictional laws in line with international standards is doubtful. Matters
of jurisdiction have not been a priority on the legislative agenda for some
time. Reform may therefore have to await the finalization of the Hague Draft
Convention,169 assuming there is an appetite in the provinces for its adoption. Even
if the Hague Draft Convention were adopted, it only addresses the jurisdiction of
foreign courts for the purposes of recognizing their judgments. Consequently,
Canadian common law jurisdictions (including CJPTA jurisdictions) would
be free to adopt the Convention while still claiming a broader jurisdictional
authority for their own courts.
168. See the text accompanying supra notes 95-99.
169. Hague Draft Convention, supra note 3.

